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Abstract
Financial crimes are a huge problem in today’s business world, and electronic financial crimes are becoming
increasingly prevalent. This study, conducted in collaboration with the Victorian Police Computer Crime
Squad, focuses on the reactions and responses of a large financial organisation to both electronic and nonelectronic financial crimes, in order to understand the issues that lead to under-reporting of electronic financial
crimes. We found that despite the organisations strict and well defined approach to reporting and prosecuting
financial crimes generally, electronic financial crimes are treated differently to non-electronic financial crimes
and do not seem to be subjected to the same standards. Electronic financial crimes are often only reported when
successful prosecution seems likely, and consequently almost all go unreported.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, electronic or computer facilitated crime in organisations has grown to be a significant problem,
causing huge financial losses to organisations worldwide each year. For instance, in 2004 AusCERT reported
that 57% of surveyed organisations reported losses from electronic crime at an average of $116,212 per
organisation. Computer crime is a global phenomenon, with the US-based 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and
Security Survey reporting that 53% of the survey respondents detected unauthorized use of their systems, with
11% unsure (CSI/FBI 2004). Similarly, the 2004 AusCERT survey results showed that 49% of the respondents
have experienced attacks that harmed the confidentiality, availability or integrity of their systems; 6% have
experienced losses through computer facilitated fraud and 13% have experienced theft of electronic proprietary
information.
While there are many surveys on the reporting of electronic crime in general, there is limited in-depth research
on the reasons behind reporting or non-reporting of individual e-crime categories. Initially, this research was
instigated in collaboration with the Victorian Police Computer Crime Squad to examine in detail the reasons
behind the non-reporting of electronic crimes in Australia, in order to improve the effectiveness of the Computer
Crime Squad in responding to such crimes.
As a result of a focus group session with Victoria Police, the research question was refined to examining
electronic financial crimes, specifically to address the strong perception within the Computer Crime Squad that
while organisations tend to report most or all non-electronic financial crimes to law enforcement agencies, they
do not seem to apply the same standards to electronic financial crimes.
Therefore, this study attempts to address this gap with the following research questions:
• How does the type of financial crime (electronic or non-electronic) affect the reactions and reporting
practices of victim organisations?
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Why do victim organisations sometimes choose to not report electronic financial crime incidents to law
enforcement bodies?

To explore this research question, we performed two initial case studies. In this paper we only report on one of
these case studies in detail, although the main research findings are supported by both case studies. The
organization in this case study is a large financial organisation with an internal investigations department, and
access was limited to members of this department.

BACKGROUND
Police data indicates that, pro rata, businesses are considerably more at risk of crime than are households, and
that the costs of crimes against businesses are a significant imposition on business. The crimes that
organisations are most concerned with are financial crimes (Smith 1999). “Financial Crimes” encompasses all
crimes which directly cause monetary loss (Smith 1999), including property crimes such as theft and breaking
in, and fraud of all varieties. Fraud and deception are the most common financial crimes: a worldwide survey
on fraud carried out by Ernst & Young in 2003 (“Fraud, the Unmanaged Risk”) concluded that more than half of
the respondents had been significantly defrauded within the last year (Ernst & Young 2003). A similar study
from KPMG stated more than 75% of its respondents had experienced an instance of fraud over the year
(KPMG 2003). In addition to fraud, property crime against organisations such as theft and unauthorized entry
with intent are extremely common, with economic losses experienced by most organisations (Walker 1995).
How organisations deal with financial crimes
According to survey statistics (KPMG 2003), the most common ways organisations deal with financial crimes
(specifically fraud) are: begin an investigation (99%); dismiss employees in question (76%); seek legal action
(64%); and report to law enforcement (64%). It is interesting that nearly all of the respondents stated that they
would at least start an investigation and/or dismiss the employee(s) in question, and that they would also report
most incidents of fraud to law enforcement. An earlier case study on incident investigations (Tan et al. 2003),
shows the importance of a more in depth research in this area as it reports that many smaller anomalous events
are ignored and not investigated; only those that are serious enough to be investigated are called incidents.
Although there is a significant body of research on financial crimes, the research tends to focus on either
electronic crimes overall (including electronic financial crimes) (AusCERT 2004, CSI/FBI 2004, Bequai 1998)
or offline financial crimes (Ernst & Young 2003, KPMG 2003, Walker 1995), but rarely examine both.
Are electronic financial crimes underreported?
As stated above, organisations have a high rate of reporting financial crimes such as fraud to law enforcement
agencies (64% for fraud, Ernst & Young 2003). This is significantly different from the survey statistics for
electronic or computer facilitated crime; only 23% of the recent AusCERT survey respondents reported
computer crime incidents to law enforcement (AusCERT 2004); and in the CSI/FBI survey of 2004, only 20%
of survey respondents reported computer crime cases to law enforcement. Additionally, the AusCERT survey
recorded that an increasing number of organisations are not reporting harmful incidents to authorities (70% in
2004 vs 62% in 2003). Both surveys have comparable statistics on the reasons for the reluctance of
organisations to report such crimes.
However, neither of these surveys make a distinction between the various types of electronic crime is terms of
organisational response. Certainly some categories of computer crime are more serious than others – for
instance, the average loss from computer-facilitated fraud per organisation in 2004 is estimated at $307,125
(AusCERT 2004), and $167,500 for theft of proprietary information, making these crimes by far the most
expensive type of electronic crime per incident, so it is reasonable to expect that organisations would have
stricter governance procedures depending on the nature of the electronic crime. It is possible that most or even
all computer facilitated fraud is reported to law enforcement agencies and that it is non-reporting of lesser
electronic crimes that result in such a low average, but anecdotal evidence from the Victorian Police Computer
Crime Squad suggests that very few electronic financial crimes are reported to law enforcement. AusCERT
reported that in 2004, 6% of responding organisations had experienced incidents involving computer facilitated
fraud, 13% theft of proprietary information and 28% unauthorized privileged access; again, anecdotal evidence
from Victorian Police suggests that only a fraction of these incidents were reported to law enforcement. The
AusCERT survey also suggests that only a small number of such incidents are reported to federal agencies such
as the Australian High Tech Crimes Centre: only 4% of respondents had reported computer crime incidents to
this body (AusCERT 2004).
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Why don’t organisations report electronic crime?
A number of reasons are given in the literature about why organisations are reluctant to report computer crime.
These include:
• The fact that some organisations are still unaware that they can report electronic crime (Dowland et al.
1999, AusCERT 2004).
• The perceived difficulty of prosecution due to the legal shortcomings in computer crime (Bell 2002),
the fact that evidence gathering is difficult (Wolf 2000), and that litigation requires evidence which
costs time and commitment for an organisation that can be substantial (Volonino 2003). Organisations
feel that they will not get back what they have lost (Taylor 2002) and the time and effort involved in
co-operation forces some organisations not to report for good business reasons. As Wolf (2000) points
out there are “no incentives to report”.
• The perceived lack of adequate punishment due to the lack of legislation (Wolf 2000) often causing
perpetrators to only be fined (Bell 2002). Bell also mentions a lack of trained prosecutors for computer
crime which may cause the offence to be ignored.
• The satisfaction with law enforcement services in terms of response time, information required to be
accessible and feedback may cause organisations to balk at reporting the crime (Taylor 2002). The
prominence of private security companies gives victim organisations another avenue other than
reporting the crime. Organisations, due to the perceived lack of police expertise, turn to private
security firms and fail to report incidents to law enforcement services (Goodman 1997). The
AusCERT survey (2004) reports that 35% of respondents believe that the law enforcement agencies are
incapable of investigating computer crime.
• The impact of negative publicity is given as a reason for many organisations for non reporting
(CSI/FBI 2004). The reasoning for this is that if a case goes to trial; the information will be on public
record, possibly damaging the company’s publicity and credibility (Bequai 1998).
• The seriousness of the offence is often a key factor in reporting. For internal incidents not of a serious
nature organisations tend to simply dismiss, warn the employee, or to use other disciplinary measures
(Taylor 2002, AusCERT 2004). For small external incidents, the organisation often feels that reporting
would not achieve anything as perpetrators will not be caught (AusCERT 2004) and that law
enforcement agencies have better things to do with their time (Goodman 1997).

THE CASE STUDY
The case study reported in this paper was undertaken at in a multinational financial institution operating in
Australia and Overseas. We will call the organisation HighFinance. HighFinance has its own fraud risk and
investigations department with a number of investigators, many with previous police experience. It is subject to
fraud of all types (e.g. cheque, credit card, internet banking) as well as other crimes such as theft and all types
of electronic crimes.
The Victorian Police is not the only agency involved in investigating electronic financial crime for this financial
institution. For some of the electronic financial crimes, in particular phishing, the organisation has a close cooperation with the Australian High Tech Crime Centre. Another common financial crime, credit card fraud, is
generally handled in co-operation with the relevant credit card corporation.
Three people from HighFinance’s fraud risk and investigations department were interviewed. These people
included the head of the department, the investigations manager and one of the investigators. Due to the nature
of the study and background of the participants they were strongly opposed to the taping of the interviews, so
notes were used instead.
The interviews were based on both open questions, developed using the previously discussed literature, and on
the discussion of certain carefully designed “scenarios”. Ideally, past crime occurrences are most useful in
answering the research question; however, most organisations see that as sensitive information and generally
refuse to talk about it. Hence hypothetical scenarios were used.
For the purposes of this study we concentrated on financial crimes, and in particular financial crimes which
have direct or close electronic equivalents. As such, we have focussed on fraud, theft of proprietary information
and unauthorized access (breaking in).
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RESULTS
Response Plan to Financial Crime
HighFinance has no pre-defined process map for crimes being investigated. However, they do have detailed
flowcharts instructing front line employees of the organisation what to do once they discover anything
suspicious. Internal reports of financial crimes are passed to the investigations department via a hotline or are
reported directly up the management chain.
Although a threshold amount is used to determine whether crimes will be investigated, anything which has
potential or confirmed staff involvement will be investigated regardless of amount. Unfortunately, the specifics
of the flowchart and the threshold amounts were deemed too confidential by the Department Head to be seen or
used as part of this research.
Responding to financial crimes:
“There are no pre-defined process maps within this department” - Department Head
“Certain thresholds are used to assess whether crimes will be investigated.” - Investigations
Manager
“The company has zero tolerance against fraud and will investigate any internal fraud, even if
it’s $1” - Investigations Manager
“Dollar value and whether the offender can be identified are the determinants on how far the
department takes it” - Investigator

In all instances, cases are reviewed by a special management team within the investigations department, and
they decide where to go from there. Sometimes, an internal investigation takes place first before they decide
whether or not they will report to the police. This is to determine whether or not the company can supply
enough information to the police to ensure that they can solve the whole case as quickly as possible.
Responding to financial crimes:
“Both normal and electronic crimes go under review of a special management team, and they,
with their vast experience, decide what to report. In some cases an internal
investigation takes place first, then they decide whether or not to report.” - Department
Head

Finally, it is interesting to note that this company brings financial crimes to the attention of police in the state of
discovery. However, if the crime occurred electronically, the Federal Police High Tech Crime Commission may
also be alerted.
Responding to financial crimes:
“In general, on criminal offences police in the relevant state where it has been perpetrated are
consulted, as well as the Federal Police High Tech Crime Commission if it’s an
electronic crime” - Investigations Manager
Factors in Reporting Financial Crime
The amount of financial loss is the main determinant for investigating and reporting external crimes (all internal
crimes, regardless of amount, get investigated and reported). If the loss is under a particular threshold, it is
generally not reported. The likelihood of obtaining sufficient evidence is also cited as an important factor.
On reporting financial crimes:
“Reporting depends on the dollar amount and ability to identify the offender.” -Investigations
Manager
“Amounts under the threshold are generally not investigated and reported unless it is a part of
a bigger scheme” - Investigator

The state where the crime is discovered also plays a significant role. In certain states, some financial crimes,
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such as fraud, are not high on the list of priorities, and as a result the company will be reluctant to waste
resources reporting an incident which is unlikely to be followed up until much later. Reporting to the police
would involve extensive gathering of relevant information on the company’s part, and that is why the
organisation wants to ensure that minimal time is wasted on gathering information on cases which are not likely
to be investigated by the state police.
On reporting financial crimes:
“Certain state police do not put fraud very high on their list of priorities, so it depends on the
state where the fraud was discovered as well” – Investigations Manager

Finally, the delay to pursue a criminal through the court process may take 2-3 years. This often acts as a
deterrent of reporting as well.
Before we discuss the factors influencing the reporting/non-reporting of electronic financial crime, we will first
look at the responses of HighFinance on two of the hypothetical scenarios we prepared.

Scenario A: Unauthorised Entry/Access
In this scenario participants were presented with scenarios describing instances of physical unauthorised access
and computer facilitated unauthorised access and asked how the company would respond.
Physical unauthorised access
In the event where a break-in has occurred physically at company premises, company policy directs that police
are notified immediately, as they are believed to have more information on potential suspects.
On physical break-ins:
“If this (break-in) happened offline police will be notified as they may have more information on
the potential suspects.” - Investigator
“We try to jump-start the police in all cases.” - Investigations Manager

Electronic Break-ins (Theft of Proprietary Information and Unauthorised access)
The first reaction taken by this company in response to successful online break-ins (where information is stolen)
is to initiate an internal investigation. Interestingly, HighFinance chooses not to report to the police at this stage
as the company can perform internal investigations quicker than the police, since they know their company
inside-out.
On electronic unauthorised access:
“An internal investigation will take place” - Department Head
“At this stage the police are not informed because in the initial stages the company can do the
investigation more efficiently as we know our systems inside out, the police don’t.” Investigations Manager
“Find out how it occurred and tighten measures accordingly to prevent any repeat offences” Investigator

An attempt will then be made to identify the offender; once the offender has been tracked, the incident may be
reported to the police, depending on two factors: location of the hacker and the potential impact of the lost
information.
On reporting to the police:
“It is harder to charge a hacker in Russia than in the USA” - Investigations Manager

Scenario B: Fraud
Participants were presented with scenarios describing instances of non-electronic fraud and computer facilitated
fraud.
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Non-electronic fraud
In this scenario the participants were asked how they would react to somebody impersonating a company
employee and using this identity to defraud company clients. Company response is to notify police
immediately, as they are believed to have more information about possible offenders which will enable the
organisation to jump-start the investigation. In this case, information will be streamlined to the police as it is
collected, with the aim of catching the offender(s) as soon as possible to avoid further damage.
On reporting offline fraud:
“Police are notified straight away, and the information relevant to the investigation will be
continuously sent to them as they are collected” - Investigations Manager
“Investigate as much as possible internally as we know our systems and customers better…
Assist police in catching the criminal as soon as possible to prevent further damage.” Investigator
On offline fraud:
“First of all, the customer will be supported and possibly reimbursed if it was deemed that
he/she was not at fault… complete details about the incident will be obtained from the
customer” - Department Head
Computer facilitated fraud
In the event of a computer facilitated fraud incident, the offenders are seen to have several advantages, such as
the difficulty in establishing the location of crime; if they are overseas, Australian jurisdiction does not affect
them (in the case of phishing, the “money transfer agents” or “mules” they hired in Australia generally take the
blame). A far greater emphasis is put on the company investigating the crime itself, as again local law
enforcement bodies are not seen as being able to deal with the crime.
In this case, comparing intelligence with the Australian High Tech Crime Centre will occur to see if this is a part
of any existing fraud. After that, they will work closely with the federal authorities in investigating this case.
Local law enforcement agencies are generally not notified.
On computer facilitated fraud:
“Firstly, it is hard to establish where the incident is from... Law enforcement can only deal with
people in Australia” - Department Head
“As for the mules, if they are found to be colluding, then they’ll be charged, if not, then
commissions will be recovered and information will be asked from the mule about how
they operate” - Investigator
“Intelligence will then be compared while reporting to see if there are any existing fraud already
taking place.” - Investigations Manager

Factors for Reporting/Not Reporting Electronic Financial Crime
From responses to the above two scenarios it is clear that electronic and non-electronic financial crimes are
treated differently. For all electronic crime, issues such as offender location, amount of loss and whether
enough information about the incident is available are critical in determining whether to report to police.
On reporting electronic financial crimes:
“Jurisdiction is the main thing here, it is difficult to chase after funds sent to Russia” Investigations Manager
“In online crimes there are many more avenues to look at and a lot more things to establish” Investigator

Similar to non-electronic financial crime, the amount of loss is once again a major factor; in general, if no loss
can be identified, it is not reported as resources are better used elsewhere. In addition, certain “trivial” incidents
are not reported for the reason that they perceive the police as either not going to react, or put it very low in
their priorities.
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On reporting electronic financial crimes:
“We have many years of police experience in our team, we know what they (the police) would
investigate” - Department Head
“If no loss can be identified, it (the incident) is not reported” - Investigator
Reporting electronic crime may also depend on whether or not enough information can be gathered. The
company is wary of wasting police resources by being unable to provide sufficient information for a successful
investigation.
On providing information to the police:
“The company may be reluctant to bog them (police) down with failed operations” Investigations Manager
“The aim is to provide as much detailed information as possible to the police so cases get
solved quickly” - Investigator

Reputation risk is another factor; the organisation thinks about the possible dangers regarding the potential
damage to the brand name when considering whether to report electronic financial crime cases. This seems less
important in non-electronic financial crimes.
On negative publicity/reputation risk:
“There are dangers that reporting certain incidents may do damage to the brand name” Department Head

Finally, the service level provided by police was cited as a reason for not reporting electronic financial crimes.
On the service levels of the police:
“As an example, at one stage the company took months to prepare evidence for this particular
case, only to have it rejected by the police – wasting the company’s time and is very
hard on the investigator as all his work goes to waste” - Department Head
“Sometimes the police are a bit slow as other crimes take priority” - Investigator

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
From the results of this case study it is evident that HighFinance responds to financial crimes in three ways:
report to law enforcement, enact customer protection and perform internal investigations. For financial crimes
occurring offline, these three steps tend to be undertaken simultaneously; however, for electronic financial
crimes, reporting to law enforcement tends to be delayed until the other two steps are complete. These findings
are consistent with the other case study conducted (but not presented here).
To summarise the important factors in organisational response to financial crimes:


For all financial crimes, these factors are important in influencing HighFinance’s decision to involve
police in their response:
o Value of crime
o Impact on organisation’s image
o Likelihood of retrieving assets/money



HighFinance consider the following factors to be positive influences in reporting non-electronic
financial crime:
o Police have local knowledge of suspects
o Police have advanced technologies investigating for physical crimes (such as fingerprinting)
o Police have the confidence of organisations in these investigations, probably due to a track
record in solving such crimes



For electronic financial crimes, HighFinance reported these reasons as likely to negatively influence
their decision to report:
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Reliable evidence is harder to obtain than for non-electronic financial crimes
Reporting may expose company to repeat offences
Difficult to explain the crime to the police
Location of the offender
Lack of confidence from organisations in the ability of the police to investigate these types of
crimes - organisations generally think that they can investigate the crime more efficiently
themselves.

These reasons are consistent with previous studies which have found that, generally, electronic crime is more
difficult to prosecute and requires more effort from the victim organisation to cooperate with law enforcement
than non-electronic crime. However, it is surprising that a large financial institution such as HighFinance does
not have a rigorous policy of reporting electronic crimes to the local law enforcement agencies, at a minimum to
fulfil auditing and legal requirements (for instance, as a simple analogy, insurance claims for property theft
generally require evidence of a police report). As previously noted, fraud itself generally has a high incidence
of reporting (64% of fraud is reported to law enforcement agencies), despite the reasons quoted by HighFinance
for not reporting such crimes (negative impact on organisations image, low likelihood of retrieving assets). The
major difference between HighFinance’s responses to electronic and non-electronic financial crime then, is the
decision to first thoroughly investigate electronic incidents before involving the police. As a consequence, the
Victorian Police Computer Crime Squad are rarely involved at any stage as this delay in reporting seems to
progress to not reporting at all.
This paper we reports on one of two case studies conducted so far. Whilst the other case study supports the
results presented here, it is impossible yet to generalise the results across all organisations. Within the case
study presented there are a number of limitations. Firstly access within the organisation was only granted to the
investigations department; we have assumed that all incidents of electronic crime are reported to the
investigations department of the organisation (and indeed this is strongly suggested by the interview subjects),
but it is quite possible that many such incidents are not even reported within the organisation, mirroring the
organisation’s response to reporting to police. Further case studies focussing on the organisation as a whole and
involving departments actually subjected to electronic crime would help resolve this. Also, there were
limitations imposed with regard to critical commercial documents dealing with processes for reporting financial
crime within the organisation. Whilst these documents were discussed by the interviewees, we were unable to
view them due to their sensitive nature.
An obvious further step for future research is to conduct additional case studies in financial institutions and
other organisations to be able to generalise the results. Further, a detailed business survey focusing on the
reporting and non reporting of individual types of electronic crime would be advantageous to address the lack of
breadth this study offers and test the results presented in this research.

CONCLUSION
This study was instigated to address the strong perception within the Victorian Police Computer Crime Squad
that organisations consistently fail to report electronic financial crime incidents. The study investigated online
and offline financial crime in a large financial institution to try to understand the issues that lead to underreporting of electronic financial crimes to law enforcement agencies.
Previous studies have shown that organisations do not report crimes that they feel are not significant – for
example, Carcach (1997) and Taylor (2002) show that organisations don’t report property crimes in cases where
the organisation feels that the crime is not serious enough. However, losses due to electronic financial crimes
such as computer-facilitated fraud and theft of proprietary information are generally far higher than losses from
other crimes (AusCERT 2004). Additionally, financial crimes are usually ‘motivated’, in that an individual (or
individuals) is responsible for and stands to gain from the crime (as compared to, for instance, virus attacks,
which would be normally be considered unmotivated). As such, one would imagine there is a much larger
chance of identifying and prosecuting the offender(s) in the case of electronic financial crimes, and thus a far
higher motivation for the victim organisation to report such incidents to police. Indeed, the 2004 US-based
CERT survey reported that only 49% of its respondents involved law enforcement agencies in their efforts to
combat crime despite 72% of the respondents having a policy of compulsory internal reporting (CERT 2004).
Despite this, the results of this study suggest that even motivated, high loss electronic crimes are subject to a
low level of reporting compared to their non-electronic equivalents.
It appears that the main difference in response to electronic versus non-electronic financial crimes is the delay in
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contacting police, and further, it appears that if reporting to police is not done immediately (upon discovery of
the incident), it is often not done at all. This means, of course, that police will not have adequate statistics on the
level of electronic financial crime in this kind of organisation and can not accurately plan its strategies to
respond to the significant growth of these crimes in the past few years. As some of the main reasons reported in
this case study for not reporting these crimes is the cost of information gathering and the low likelihood of the
police actually following up a report with a full scale investigation, it might be useful to consider separating
statistics and intelligence gathering from the full reporting of electronic financial crimes for prosecution
purposes. A liaison program between police and medium-to-large organisations, which promotes the use of light
weight and possibly anonymous reporting facilities, might be useful to change the perception that police is not
interested or not capable of investigating the majority of these crimes.
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